Fourth of July weekend 2012 is the 149th anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg. There will be a lot written about the battle in the next year by true Civil War and Gettysburg experts. I have enjoyed walking the battlefield a number of times and am always struck by a new leadership lesson when I visit. These are some of the lessons learned from a couple of visits to Gettysburg in the last year. Consider making the trip yourself if you are in the area. Read Michael Shaara’s The Killer Angels or watch Turner’s “Gettysburg” movie (the script is almost exactly the same as Sharra’s book) before you visit. Pay attention to the individual stories as well as the overall strategies. You will see the leadership lessons as well.
1. Tactical immediacy will trump strategic primacy every time.
General Robert E Lee intended for the decisive battle not to be fought at Gettysburg but rather closer to Philadelphia, Harrisburg or Baltimore. Brigadier General John Buford’s Union cavalry forced Confederate General Heth’s division into battle on July 1st 1863 outside of Gettysburg against the specific orders of Lee, forcing the battle earlier than Lee wanted and yielding the initiative and ultimately the high ground to the Union army. Heth’s men were heading toward Gettysburg to look for shoes, a very tactical exercise.
2. Initiative is almost always a good idea.
Union General John Reynolds took the initiative and deployed his Corps to the high ground southwest of Gettysburg on July 1st, which turned out to be one of the key strategic decisions of the battle. Brigadier General Gouveneur Warren, an engineer staff officer probably saved the high ground from being turned when he ordered without any authority to do so, Colonel Strong Vincent’s Brigade to defend Little Round Top on the afternoon of July 2nd. Colonel Joshua Chamberlain, part of Vincent’s brigade, repulsed the last threat to the high ground when he ordered and executed a bayonet charge against the Confederate’s flank attack late on the afternoon of July 2nd.
3. Sometimes what seems right isn’t (or doesn’t turn out to be).
General Richard Ewell’s Corps failed to take Cemetery Hill at the end of the first day of battle. General Lee issued an order for him to take it “if practicable.” He decided it was late in the afternoon and so not practicable. And the Confederates lost their best shot at gaining the high ground. General George Pickett’s Charge on July 3rd, the last day of the battle also seemed like a good idea to some Confederate leadership but didn’t turn out to be.
4. Take council of your fellows.
Confederate Generals James Longstreet and John Bell Hood both recognized need to flank the southern end of Union Line on the first days of the battle, but General Lee steadfastly resisted.
5. In the smoke of battle it is easy to believe what you want to believe.
Just before Pickett’s charge on July 3rd, the Union guns were silenced during the Confederates cannon barrage. The Confederates thought the guns had been destroyed. They were just conserving ammunition.
6. Synchronization is worth the effort.
On the second and third days of the battle, the Confederate attacks on the right and left of the Union flank were poorly coordinated and lost their best chance of being successful of drawing forces from the center of the line to the flanks in anticipation of the third day’s charge.
7. Hold the high ground whenever possible (moral, intellectual, and physical)
The entire battle hinged on the Union’s hold on the high ground and the Confederates’ vain attempts to dislodge them.
8. Basics are basic.
On the second day of the battle Confederate soldiers attacking the left flank of the Union line on a hot, late July afternoon run out of water and ultimately “ran out of steam.” Confederate Artillery Commander Porter Alexander moved the Confederate artillery supply trains further to the rear on July 3rd and couldn’t resupply during Pickett’s charge.
9. The indirect approach is usually the best approach.
The final assault of the Confederate forces against the Union lines on July 3rd (Pickett’s Charge) was not the indirect approach. Most experts agree that the Confederates could have outflanked the Union forces on the left or south end of the line but stopped trying after the 20th Maine’s bayonet charge in the afternoon of July 2nd.
10. People are the major complicating factor.
Union General Daniel Sickles moved his III Corps forward without orders into the Peach Orchard to what he felt was higher ground on the second day of the battle, but he exposed a salient in the Union line that almost cost the Union their position. Sickles also lost his leg in the fight.
11. Keep your eyes and ears open.
The Confederates fought for two days without General Jeb Stewart and his cavalry forces and thus no real knowledge for General Lee on the Union’s forces. General Lee was operating “blind” with no knowledge of the position of the Union forces.
12. Seize opportunities when they present themselves.
The Confederates were badly beaten. Heavy rain fell after the battle. General George Meade failed to pursue and trap General Lee and his retreating forces at the banks of the swollen Potomac. The effort could have ended or shortened the war.
13. Balance exposure and example with expendability.
General John Reynolds was killed and General Winfield S Hancock later badly wounded while on horseback directing their soldiers. Both were severe losses for the Union troops.
14. Distrust hope in the absence of fact.
The Confederates believed that the Union Cannons are destroyed and silenced by their barrage just before Pickett’s Charge on July 3rd. They found out soon enough that their assumption was wrong.
15. Retreat may be the right strategic move.
General Lee’s retreat from Gettysburg back to Virginia in the rain was risky but successful. The war continued for two more years.
Lessons from military history can be applied with caution to other dimensions of our lives. In remembering the heroism and sacrifices of the men and women who waged these battles as well as their triumphs and mistakes, we do them honor and increase the likelihood that that we will learn from them.
General Joshua Chamberlain dedicated the monument to the 20th Maine Regiment at Gettysburg on October 3rd, 1889. His words remind us of the lessons and the inspiration we derive from remembering history.
“In great deeds something abides. On great fields something stays. Forms change and pass; bodies disappear; but spirits linger, to consecrate ground for the vision-place of souls. And reverent men and women from afar, and generations that know us not and that we know not of, heart-drawn to see where and by whom great things were suffered and done for them, shall come to this deathless field, to ponder and dream; and lo! the shadow of a mighty presence shall wrap them in its bosom, and the power of the vision pass into their souls. This is the great reward of service. To live, far out and on, in the life of others; this is the mystery of the Christ, – to give life’s best for such high stake that it shall be found again unto life eternal.”
Chuck Callahan Henry V 4.3 – Lead from the Front https://henryv43.wordpress.com/
Henry V 4.3 
#4 above– what a tight rope General Lee walked . . . being celebrated as the “soldier’s general” with constant concern for “how the troops were doing” while also being a general that took wise counsel of his fellows into consideration and perhaps resisted several times during Gettysburg either advice from trusted counsel or strategic or tactical imperative in defense of “his soldiers”– something I ponder when I hear the “people first or mission first” debate.
Lessons Learned from BG Henry Jackson Hunt:
Lessons Learned from BG Henry Jackson Hunt
*Appropriate Training was key to success with regards to his artillery
personnel. His orders were followed and the training for his personnel
warranted excellent results – slow firing with accurate effectiveness.
*Forgot to mention during my topic that he saw firsthand the terrain before
the battle when he was sent on behalf of General Meade to talk with BG
Sickles about his wrong position.
*General Hunt did not allow political pressure to change his strategy during
the battle. He knew what he was doing and was sure that it would be
effective. He wrote the “bible” for artillery in 1861 and the War
Department had adopted his strategies.
Lessons Learned from the Gettysburg Staff Ride 12 SEP 13:
1. A leader must know his subordinates and tailor his/her leadership style
to that individual. I.e. General Lee’s habit of giving a subordinate polite
and indirect orders did not work so well with Ewell on the first day. Ewell
would have benefitted from the more direct orders Chamberlain got on the 2nd
day. On the other hand, Chamberlain probably didn’t need the direct orders
and probably would have carried out the same actions with a less direct
order.
2. A leader must follow up on his/her orders even with trusted subordinates.
Stuart and Ewell both failed Lee at Gettysburg (although it is debatable
whether anyone could have taken Cemetery Hill on the evening of the 1st
day). Sickles failed Meade on the 2nd day in disobeying his orders. By the
time Meade found out about it, it was too late.
3. Leaders must challenge their own preconceptions and consider all possible
COAs. Heth did not do so on the first day. I believe Lee did not do so
after the 2nd day, although he may have and rejected the others.
4. Leaders who displayed excellent judgment/leadership: Buford, Howard (in
preparing Cemetery Hill as a fallback position – not so much in failing to
defend Oak Hill), Reynolds, Strong Vincent, Chamberlain. There were many on
both sides at Brigade level and lower who exhibited excellent tactical
leadership. Few on the Confederate side at Division level or above
exhibited exceptional leadership during this battle though, which was
unusual.
5. Leaders should realize when they are acting in an uncharacteristic manner
and question why and whether that is wise. General Lee acted
uncharacteristically in several respects during this battle and it did not
turn out well.
6. There is an analysis of leadership lessons from Gettysburg here:
http://network.intuit.com/2013/07/01/gettysburg-leadership/.
Lessons Learned from General George Meade:
Meade won one of the Civil War’s greatest battles and yet in its aftermath he was assigned a big brother (Grant) to keep him at close reach for the rest of the war. This happened for two primary reasons: 1. Meade had a temper that he had difficulty keeping in check. For this reason he at times did not benefit from information that could/should have been made available to him but his subordinates kept their distance. 2. Meade did not follow up his victory and immediately attack Lee in his weakened state (there were very logical and legitimate tactical reasons for this, but they may not been good enough reasons when looked at from a strategic lens as the end of the war might have been in his grasp).